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E409VILS Sentence UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 05 CR 621 (RJS) V. 5 GARY ALAN TANAKA AND ALBERTO WILLIAM VILAR, 6 Defendants. 7 -----x 8 New York, N.Y. 9 April 24, 2014 9:51 a.m. 10 Before: 11 12 HON. RICHARD J. SULLIVAN 13 District Judge 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 PREET BHARARA United States Attorney for the 16 Southern District of New York 17 BENJAMIN NAFTALIS JUSTIN ANDERSON 18 Assistant United States Attorneys FREDERICK H. COHN 19 Attorney for Defendant Gary Alan Tanaka 20 VIVIAN SHEVITZ 21 YING STAFFORD Attorneys for Defendant Alberto William Vilar 22 23 24 25

decided to have the sentencings go forward together just

because there's so many overlapping issues and motions and

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arguments that are joined by the two defendants. It struck me as sort of unfair to have somebody go second where, you know, all -- much of the decision-making would have been done by the time the second person went. So I thought we'd do it this way. I'm very mindful, of course, that I'm sentencing two individuals. And I'll keep that in mind throughout. But I just want to make sure that's okay with all of you.

MR. COHN: That's the only way to fly as far as I'm concerned.

THE COURT: I think that's right.

Good. I should also mention occasionally we have school groups come in and out of the court. So, the district executive told me there is a group I think coming from Midwood High School at some point today. If they come in -- you're already here. Welcome. So I thought you were going to be here at 10:00. Well, welcome. You're welcome here as well. So thanks for being here early.

So I want to go over with the parties what I've reviewed in connection with sentencing. And, of course, let me know if I've left anything out. This is a case with a lot of history. And so I have reviewed everything from the prior sentencing. I stated on the record what that was. I don't think I need to restate it. That includes the sentencing submissions from the defendants and the government. It includes numerous letters. It includes trial testimony. We

had a hearing. There was hearing testimony. So I've reviewed all of that again.

I've also reviewed the transcript from the last sentencing hearing. I have rereviewed portions of the transcript from the criminal trial. I've reviewed, of course, the Second Circuit's opinion in the appeal in this case, U.S. v. Vilar which is at 729 F.3d 62.

And then I just want to go over quickly what I've reviewed that has been submitted more recently in connection with the resentencing. I have reviewed, of course, the government's submission of March 31, which is a 16-page single-space submission with a number of attachments. I've reviewed that.

I have reviewed also the government's April 1 submission with respect to forfeiture. That is a 6-page single-space submission with a preliminary order of forfeiture/money judgment that is proposed and attached.

I have reviewed the Rule 33 motion filed by Ms. Shevitz that is joined by Mr. Tanaka. I guess that was dated April 14.

I have also reviewed the sentencing memoranda of Ms. Shevitz ands Ms. Stafford on behalf of Mr. Vilar. It's an 80-page, double-space submission.

I've also reviewed the April 14 sentencing submission from Mr. Cohn which is a 7-page, single-space submission,

includes attachments. Among them is a 12-page, single-space letter from Mr. Tanaka's wife, Renata, as well as a letter from his mother that I've read. I thank them for taking the time to write.

I have reviewed an April 21 letter, one sentence letter from the government just indicating the attachment of the victim impact statement from Ms. Graciela Lecube-Chavez, which I've read.

I then have a letter that I received from Mr. Begos on behalf of the Mayers in connection with the SEC matter that I issue an order asking the parties to just respond to attachment. So I received an April 23 letter from the government on that subject.

I think there's a reference to a trial transcript page. I think it's actually inaccurate. I think it should be trial transcript page 1385 to 1368 not 1285 to 1268, a one-page letter.

I then have an April 23 letter from Ms. Shevitz which is also a one-page letter.

I then received late yesterday afternoon government's reply memorandum dated April 23. It's a 7-page, single-space letter with a variety of attachments.

Then I also received a response to that by Ms. Shevitz dated April 23 as well. It's a 3-page response.

I should say that I didn't authorize any reply

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memorandums here. So you should have checked with me first. I have read these submissions. They haven't altered my view on anything. I've been thinking about this for a while. So the issues addressed haven't altered my conclusions or at least my tentative conclusions on those things. So, I've read them. They're part of the record. But I did think that was worth pointing out.

I've also, I quess, reviewed materials from the SEC case that are publicly docketed that I may reference as we go. But there is a related SEC case that has spawned a lot of submissions from counsel here and others and I'm familiar with that case. I'm presiding over it. And I've reviewed a number of submissions in connection with that case as well.

Are there any other submissions or things that I've overlooked?

Ms. Shevitz?

MS. SHEVITZ: Mr. Cohn's response to your order yesterday. I don't think you mentioned that.

It's hardly relevant, Judge. I said that MR. COHN: the thing that you were asking us to submit to was out of time and that was my response.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. COHN: And if that affects your sentencing, I'm checking out.

THE COURT: All right. I should have mentioned that.

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But thank you.

MS. SHEVITZ: I'm just wondering whether we could identify the documents by the ECF filing numbers as opposed to how many pages they are just to make the record extremely clear.

THE COURT: To go back over the documents I just mentioned by the ECF filing number?

MS. SHEVITZ: My cocounsel thinks that that's unnecessary.

MR. COHN: I think it's burdensome actually.

THE COURT: I'll agree that it's burdensome. I think I'd have trouble probably doing that just because I haven't scribbled it. But everything has been docketed, I believe, so I think it's all pretty clear.

Government, anything that I've left out?

MR. NAFTALIS: Not that we're aware of, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So, let me start with the Rule 33 motion. I've reviewed the parties' submissions on that. So I'm prepared to rule. If anybody has anything they want to say now before I do, I will give you an opportunity. But I think you've made your arguments and your points.

Anyone?

MS. SHEVITZ: Are you saying you're prepared to rule?

THE COURT: On the Rule 33.

MS. SHEVITZ: The substance of the motion now?

1 THE COURT: I'm prepared to rule on the motion. 2 MS. SHEVITZ: Okay. 3 MR. NAFTALIS: Nothing from the government aside from 4 what we've already written, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: I find the motion is untimely, in fact 6 very untimely. Rule 33 requires motions to be submitted within 7 14 days of conviction or three years after conviction if based on new evidence. Either way the deadline has long passed. I 8 9 fine that there is no excusable neglect for the delay. The 10 defendants have been making many of these same or similar 11 arguments for years. They've had access to all the relevant 12 documents for the entire period. So I'm going to deny the Rule 13 33 motion. 14 That doesn't prejudice the defendants' ability to 15 bring a 2255 on at least some of the issues, and that was referenced also in the Circuit's opinion. But the Rule 33 16 17 motion I'm going to deny. Okay. 18 that it's alternatively broad under 2255. 19

MS. SHEVITZ: Your Honor, we did say in the motion

THE COURT: I'm not going to resolve the 2255 now. I'm just ruling on the Rule 33.

MS. SHEVITZ: Okay.

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THE COURT: I now want to just go back to the presentence reports. I didn't order new presentence reports in this case. I think the parties have had opportunities to

review the old presentence reports. They've made objections to them and developed a full record in relation to the presentence reports. I just want to make sure, Mr. Cohn, you weren't here, Ms. Shevitz you weren't here at the last sentencing, but you've reviewed the presentence reports and discussed them with your clients?

MR. COHN: I have reviewed it, your Honor. Your order appointing me -- your order said that there would not be a new presentence report. I did challenge, due to the appeal and the ruling of the Second Circuit, two levels that the presentence report assigned at the last hearing and I dealt with that separately and I don't know whether that was a challenge to the prior report or not. But that's the only issue that I have with the report.

THE COURT: Look, I think there are a number of arguments that have been made about the report and the proper application of the sentencing guidelines. We'll talk about that in a moment.

Ms. Shevitz you've reviewed the presentence report with your client and discussed it?

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes.

THE COURT: And I think -- I'm confident but you tell me if you're less confident that objections to the presentence report, to the conclusions and findings in that report have been developed as part of your sentencing submissions? Is

there anything else you'd like to say with respect to the presentence report that isn't in your submissions? Let me put it that way.

MS. SHEVITZ: I have to think about that.

Not really, except that a presentence report with so many conclusions that are not accurate really shouldn't be following the defendants into an institution. That's my objection to that.

THE COURT: So let me remind Mr. Vilar and Tanaka about the different factors that a court has to take into consideration. And this is for everyone, I guess. Judges are required to consider different factors or objectives of sentencing. And I went through them at the first sentencing that we had.

Among those factors are the history and characteristics of the defendants. I have to consider each of you as individuals. And your entire lives. Not just this crime. I have to take into account all that you've done, good and generous and in between and bad, everything. Everybody's complicated. And that it's important to look at the entire person and to sentence a person based on their entire life.

I also have to consider the facts and circumstances of these crimes. Not just what the crimes are named; the actual details of what took place, over how long a period of time, who did what to whom. And it's important that the sentence imposed

reflects and -- well reflects the seriousness of the crime and promotes respect for the law and provides a just punishment for the crime.

I also have to consider another factor that's related but I think different and that's the need to deter or discourage you and others from committing crimes like this in the future. The notion there is that a judge in imposing a sentence sends a message and the message, hopefully, that is received by the defendants but also by a larger public is that crime doesn't pay, that it's not worth engaging in criminal conduct and that people might be discouraged and there will be less crime in the future. That's the hope. It's sometimes hard to predict. It's kind of speculating in some ways about future conduct. But Congress has said that courts should consider this. I think most of us recognize that there's something to that. So that's a factor that I also have to consider.

I have to consider your own needs while you're in custody. Each of you have health issues and those are things that have to be addressed. Many defendants have other issues that also need to be addressed while they're in custody and judges should take that into account.

I need also to consider the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and I think you're probably familiar with those by now. Others here may be less familiar. The Sentencing

Guidelines are a big book that is put out by a commission, and that's a commission that includes some judges and lawyers and experts in the field. And the way it works is that a judge like me is directed to look to that book for guidance. It's not a mandatory guideline but it's — it's something the courts are directed to look to and consider.

And the way it works is that every crime or type of crime has a chapter or chapters in that book. And the judge is directed to go to the proper chapter and make certain findings of fact and, based on those findings of fact, assign points. And it becomes a fairly mathematical exercise of adding and subtracting. And on the basis of that adding and subtracting, the judge comes up with a number. And that number is referred to as the offense level. The judge then does a different calculation under a different chapter in the book that relates to criminal history and that's, generally speaking, so that people who have prior convictions and have previously been engaged in crime are typically going to be treated more harshly than people with no prior convictions.

So the judge goes through, finds if there are any prior convictions; if so, when they were, for how long, and does another exercise of adding points and comes up with another number. And that number is referred to as the Criminal History Category. There are six criminal history categories. Category I is the lowest. Category VI is the highest.

Then on the basis of those two numbers, the offense level on the one hand and the Criminal History Category on the other, the judge goes to the back of this book where there's a grid, a table, and simply goes down this column which is the offense level and across these columns which are the criminal history categories. And where they intersect that's the spot that in the view of the commission would be the appropriate sentence according to this book.

Now a judge is not required to follow the book. But that's usually where sentencing begins. The judge starts there, makes findings under the guidelines and then we go back and talk about these other factors.

I guess the last factor that judges are asked to consider is the need to avoid unwarranted disparity in the sentence of defendants in one case as opposed to other similarity situated defendants. And that's simply the sense that it's important for a judge to take a step back and make sure the sentence imposed in one case is not wildly out of line with what is imposed in other cases that are similar with defendants that are similar, recognizing no two cases are exactly alike and no two defendants are exactly similar.

So those are the factors that I have to consider and I have to weigh them and balance them. And sometimes that's a tricky process because some of these are in tension with each other.

We're going to start now with the guidelines calculations. Once I've done that, I'll then ask the lawyers if they wish to be heard beyond what they have submitted. I will give them a chance to address any of these other factors that they think relevant. I will give the government a chance to respond. I'll then give the victims an opportunity to speak if they wish. And then finally I will give each of you an opportunity to speak. You have a right to speak. You're not required to but you're certainly welcome to and, as I said, you have a right to. So I will give you that opportunity.

Ms. Shevitz.

MS. SHEVITZ: Judge, I need to backup for a minute because when you asked if the defendants had read the presentence report, yes, but they did not see yesterday's submission by the government.

THE COURT: Yesterday's.

MS. SHEVITZ: At all. The one that came in last night at 5:00 yesterday, they did not see that.

THE COURT: All right. Well if you want them to take a look at that now you can. As I said, it's not going to have a material impact on my sentence. But if they want to take a few minutes to read it, it's about seven pages long, so they can do that. As I said, I didn't give any permission to file a reply and so I hadn't expected it either. But it shouldn't take too long to read.

1 Do you want to do that? Mr. Cohn, do you? 2 MR. COHN: I take your representation that it doesn't 3 affect your sentence at all at face value and therefore I don't 4 care. 5 THE COURT: Ms. Shevitz. 6 MS. SHEVITZ: I don't know if it affects your Honor's 7 decision or not in reality, and I'd just like to have my clients at least read what's here before they're sentenced. 8 9 THE COURT: You can take a look. That's fine. 10 (Pause) 11 MR. COHN: Your Honor, with respect, if they're 'going 12 to read the seven page, single-space document I don't know that 13 you want to sit there while they do it. 14 THE COURT: We can take a short break if you'd like. 15 MR. COHN: Well it's up to you, your Honor. THE COURT: We'll take about a ten-minute break. 16 17 MR. COHN: I've been through Mr. Tanaka's reading of 18 stuff. He's very thorough and it takes some time. And I just 19 want to advise the court that you might find it more convenient 20 for you, not for me, that if you want to leave the bench until 21 we're ready. 22 THE COURT: That's fine. So we'll take --23 MS. SHEVITZ: I apologize but I have not had an 24 opportunity to review this with them.

THE COURT: You don't have to apologize. That's fine.

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Your client is in custody so it's harder to get in things than would otherwise be the case. So that's fine if you want to take a minute or a few minutes to do that.

MS. SHEVITZ: Thank you.

THE COURT: We'll take a short adjournment. All right. About ten minutes I expect should probably be sufficient. Thanks.

(Recess)

THE COURT: So defendants have had a chance to read the government's reply.

So let's go forward then with the sentencing guidelines. I'm going to make my findings under the guidelines. There is no dispute -- first of all, there are twelve counts in the indictment. Mr. Vilar was convicted on all twelve; Mr. Tanaka on three.

Each of the counts should be grouped together for guidelines purposes and so there is no dispute that the base offense level is level 7 pursuant to section 2B1.1(a)(1) of the guidelines.

The next enhancement relates to loss. There is a table under section 2B1.1 that relates to the amount of loss in the fraud. In 2010, I found that the total was about \$22 million in loss, which therefore yielded a guidelines increase of 22 levels.

This time around the defendants are arguing that there

is no loss or alternatively that the only loss is the lost interest from 2003 or 2004 to 2005 on the ground that the money to pay investors was never lost because it was always in Amerindo's accounts.

Although the defendants argue that they're focusing on loss amounts instead of credits against loss or deductions from loss, this is really the same argument that was raised last time. I think it's the same argument that was raised on appeal. I reject it for the same reasons that I rejected it before and for the same reasons that the circuit gave when it rejected this argument on the appeal. I also don't agree that as a factual matter that there were always sufficient assets to pay investors. But I think that's not even relevant for purposes of calculating the loss.

So with respect to the loss, my calculations are as follows. There was Graciela Lecube-Chavez, the government wants to use the same amount of loss as was found in 2010, which is equal to the unpaid balance left in her account. The defendants didn't raise any specific objections to this amount other than to say that it should be zero or close to zero. So I find that the amount is proper -- is appropriately \$48,434.12.

With respect to the Mayers, again, the government wants to use the loss amount that was used in 2010 which was equal to the Mayers last investment in the GFRDA account in

2001. Now the Court has recently received a letter from the Mayers' attorney containing a more recent statement from June of 2004 showing a balance of \$11,224,936.46. From trial testimony, including Tanaka Exhibit FZ, this appears to be a statement that was faxed from Renata Tanaka to the Mayers in August of 2004. That amount includes interest that accrued over time. But as the circuit -- Second Circuit has held in United States v. Hsu, at 669 F.3d 112 at 120 through 122, a case that was cited approvingly by the circuit in the Vilar appeal, "When investors are told that their account has accrued interest, that interest counts towards loss." So to be more consistent with the Lecube-Chavez calculation, it seems appropriate that the calculation here should be the amount of the last statement perhaps minus subsequent distributions.

Now from the SEC case and from trial testimony in this case, we know that the Mayers received a little over \$800,000 from Amerindo between June of 2004 and May of 2005. The documents supporting those distributions can be found in the declaration of Neal Jacobson in the SEC case at docket number 333, Exhibit F, which the defendants had an opportunity to respond to in the SEC case, and also Lisa Mayer testified about these payments at the trial, and that testimony is in the trial transcript at pages 1292 to 1297.

So, I think it could be argued that subtracting those distributions from the statement amount would be appropriate,

although one could argue, frankly, that the credit shouldn't be deducted since it was paid after the Mayers had realized that something was wrong in Amerindo and were already considering legal options. And I'll refer the parties to Section 2B1.1, application note 3(E)(i), which says that money returned shouldn't be counted towards loss if it was returned to the victim before the offense was detected, and then defines what that means. So, that doesn't really matter for purposes of loss. I find that the amount is \$10,418,089.98. But whether it's eleven million or ten-and-a-half million doesn't really affect the loss calculation.

With respect to Lily Cates. Again, the government wants to use the same loss amount as in 2010. In reviewing the presentence report, the submissions in the SEC case and the trial testimony, I find that \$500,000 from the SBIC investment was transferred to the Lawrence Appet Trust at Ms. Cates's direction. And I think evidence of that transfer can be found in the Jacobson declaration in the civil case at, again, docket number 333, Exhibit C, and in the presentence report at paragraphs 39 and 43. Since that money was returned to Cates's control before disclosure of the fraud, I think that should be deducted from loss. So for Lily Cates I calculate loss to be \$9,270,133.85. And I find that this loss applies to both defendants even though Mr. Tanaka was acquitted at trial on the substantive count relating to this transaction. I find that,

first of all, Mr. Tanaka was convicted of the conspiracy and the investment adviser fraud counts. I also find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Tanaka was involved in that fraud and certainly under Second Circuit precedent United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518 at 527 courts may consider acquitted conduct in sentencing. So, that amount will apply to Mr. Tanaka as well as to Mr. Vilar.

Now the government doesn't seek to include loss for Tara Colburn or Robert Cox, presumably because the circuit didn't explicitly find that they were in America when their transactions were engaged in. I've since, however, granted summary judgment to the SEC in the civil case finding that both of those investors were in America when they invested and I now find by a preponderance of the evidence that they were both in America. That is both for the reasons set forth in the summary judgment reconsideration opinion, in the SEC case, and based also on the evidence at trial including Government Exhibit 3331-15, which is an application from Tara Colburn for her \$1 million GFRDA investment and it also listed her address at Los Angeles. So for Tara Colburn I find the loss to be the same as I did in 2010 which is \$936,371.78.

Robert Cox, I find the loss to be the same as last time, which is \$105,825.55.

So that is a total loss, if you add them up, of \$20,778,855.28.

Now, there are numerous other GFRDA investors. Just one minute. It could be argued that they too were victims. The government made that argument at the last sentence. I denied it finding there wasn't sufficient evidence in the record to make those findings.

I'm not going to add any other GFRDA investors among the victims or include their losses as part of the loss under the sentencing guidelines. Certainly those investors will be able to participate in any distribution in the SEC case. But I'm not counting them as included in the loss.

So that yields a guidelines increase of 22 under section 2B1.1(b)(1)(L).

MS. SHEVITZ: Judge.

THE COURT: Ms. Shevitz.

MS. SHEVITZ: The court of appeals said that on remand the district court must decide what acts — what acts constitute the offense conduct for the purpose of calculating the appropriate loss amount at sentencing. I'm reading from 729 F.3d at 67. And I ask the Court to state expressly what acts constitute the offense conduct that support this loss figure, these loss figures.

THE COURT: All right. I mean I'm relying on the same evidence and the same conclusions that are set forth in my SEC reconsideration opinion. So that's the basis for the finding.

MS. SHEVITZ: But I don't know what -- I'm asking, because the court of appeals directed that there be a finding specifically on what acts constitute the offense conduct. I don't believe those acts have been specified in anything. And I think for this proceeding, so that I have a record, I would like to ask the court to specify the acts that constitute the offense conduct.

THE COURT: The acts are the --

MS. SHEVITZ: The acts.

THE COURT: The acts are the reaching out to those victims and their investment in the GFRDA during the life of the conspiracy while they were in the United States, which is really I think what the focus was, whether or not this was a —this presented a Morrison problem. So I think I've laid that out in the SEC decision. If you disagree, obviously you can take that up with the Court of Appeals. But I think — I think that should be sufficient.

MS. SHEVITZ: You won't -- there is no further specification of the act because the Court of Appeals I believe was asking this because there has to be a nexus between the acts causing the loss and that's why the Court of Appeals said on remand that the district court must decide what acts constitute the offense conduct for the purpose of calculating the loss. I still don't know how any specific act is related to proximately causing any particular loss.

THE COURT: All right. I think -- I think you and I may disagree on that. I think I've made my record.

In any event, so that is the finding with respect to the loss amount.

Now, there are other enhancements that the government seeks. The government seeks a two-level increase under Section 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) because a substantial part of the scheme was conducted abroad. The defendants argue that this increase shouldn't apply because of the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison. I don't agree. Where a victim is in America and the perpetrator was abroad, there is no Morrison problem and Section 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) is appropriate as an enhancement. The application notes for 2B1.1 make clear that this increase is about dealing with individuals who seek to avoid U.S. law by operating abroad and I certainly find that that is what happened here. So I do think that two-level enhancement is appropriate.

The government seeks a four-level increase under section 2B1.1(b)(19)(A)(iii) because the defendants were investment advisers. The defendants I think concede as much and don't object to this enhancement. I find it's appropriate. So I will add a four-level enhancement for the defendants being investment advisers.

The government also seeks a two-level enhancement under 3B1.1(c) because the defendants were organizers, leaders

in this criminal activity. The defendants argue that this enhancement should not apply because the two of them were equal partners in a two-person scheme.

I find that the defendants managed or supervised Renata Tanaka who was a participant in the scheme and was an unindicted coconspirator and that this enhancement is, therefore, appropriate. I also note that arguably a four-level enhancement under Section 3B1.1(a) would be appropriate because the scheme was otherwise extensive and that it spanned many years, was highly sophisticated, involved several of Amerindo's offices and entities, and many of Amerindo's numerous employees as unwitting participants. But I don't think I need to go there. I think the two-level adjustment is appropriate and sufficient under the circumstances.

So adding all of these up yields an offense level of 37 for both defendants.

Each of the defendants has no prior criminal history so they're in Criminal History Category I.

So with an offense level of 37 and a Criminal History Category of I, the guidelines range is 210 to 262 months, which is about 17-and-a-half years to about 22 years. That's the same guidelines range I found applied back at the sentencing in 2010. So, those are my findings with respect to the guidelines.

Now while we're at it and while I've spent a fair

amount of time talking about loss, I think it makes sense now to talk about restitution and forfeiture, just because they're similar but distinct calculations.

The government seeks restitution to the victims in the amount of the loss for each victim plus 3.25% compounding interest through 2013. The defendants have objected that there shouldn't be any restitution because there isn't any loss.

I've already rejected that argument.

With respect to interest, I find that 3.25% is a reasonable amount for prejudgment interest. Arguably the higher IRS refund rate would be more appropriate. I had previously ordered nine percent the last time. The Circuit seemed to suggest without ruling that that might be high. So I'm going to scale it back to 3.25% compounding.

That means that with respect to Graciela

Lecube-Chavez, I find restitution for the loss amount of

\$484,344.12 plus 3.25% compounding interest from 2005 to 2013.

For the Mayers, I find restitution for the loss amount of \$10,418,089.98, plus 3.25% compounding interest from 2005 to 2013, minus the \$200,000 that has already been paid to the Mayers as hardship payments under the SEC case.

For Lily Cates, I find restitution for the loss amount of \$9,270,133.85 plus 3.25 compounding interest from 2005 to 2013. Again, I find that Mr. Tanaka is responsible for this restitution because of his convictions on the conspiracy count

and the investment adviser fraud count. And I refer the parties to Title 18 of the United States Code Section 3664(a) which provides that if a court finds that more than one defendant has contributed to the loss of a victim, the court may make each defendant liable for payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion liability among the defendants to reflect the level of contribution to the victim's loss and economic circumstances of each defendant. I also refer the parties to United States v. Boyd which is 222 F.3d 47 at 51 which, again, recognizes a court may order a participant in a conspiracy to pay restitution even on uncharged or acquitted counts, substantive counts.

Because I find that Ms. Colburn and Mr. Cox were also in America when they made their investments, I'm going to grant them restitution. So I find restitution in the amount of \$936,371.78 plus 3.25% compounding interest for Ms. Colburn and \$105,825.55 plus 3.25% compounding interest for Mr. Cox.

Now since there is some recalculation here with respect to the numbers and the interest compounding, I'm going to direct the government to submit a proposed restitution order and an affidavit setting forth the interest calculations by close of business today.

With respect to forfeiture, the government is also seeking forfeiture equal to the loss amounts. The defendants raise a few objections. First, they argue that they have a

jury right to determine forfeiture. 1 2 Did you want to say something about restitution? 3 MS. SHEVITZ: Yes, I do. 4 In the Razmilovic case, I think --5 THE COURT: The case that's been cited, not 6 pronounced. 7 MS. SHEVITZ: Yes. I can't pronounce it. The court there discussed how when money is frozen that is going to go 8 9 there with disgorgement, that it applies equally to 10 restitution. There is no money that's been earning interest. 11 Consequently, in that case, which we can't pronounce, the Court 12 said that it was not appropriate to award interest. We have 13 raised that again for the restitution issue. There is no money 14 that has been earning interest. The defendants have not been 15 able to earn interest. JP Morgan is earning interest. That's 16 the only one who is earning interest. So, I will object, 17 again, under that theory. It is impossible to pay interest 18 when there has been no way of earning interest on that money. 19 THE COURT: I think you made this point in your 20 papers. 21 Mr. Cohn, did you want to say anything? 22 MR. COHN: I just join in that. 23 THE COURT: All right. Government want to be heard on 24 that issue? 25 MR. NAFTALIS: Only if you want us to, your Honor. Ι

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think there was evidence put in in the SEC case that the accounts were accruing interest, as I recall.

THE COURT: In any event --

MR. NAFTALIS: Regardless, I don't think that's relevant to the question of the defendant -- the victims being deprived of their funds, which is the point of restitution.

THE COURT: I think that there's a distinction between disgorgement and restitution and I think that's the distinction that Ms. Shevitz is blurring. In any event, I think the objection is preserved. You've made your points. But that's my finding with respect to restitution.

With respect to forfeiture, as I said, there are a number of arguments that the defendants raise. First, they argue that they have a jury right to determine forfeiture. I reject that argument. I think it's counter to the Supreme Court's holding in Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 at 48 through 49. I don't think Apprendi has undermined that case. Certainly the Supreme Court hasn't held so. So until they overrule it, I feel bound by it.

Second, the defendants argue that forfeiture should be for profits not for gross receipts. The Second Circuit has rejected that argument in United States v. Peters, 732 F.3d 93 at 102. So I reject it as well.

Third, the defendants say that the Court never entered a preliminary order of forfeiture in violation of Rule

32.2(b)(2)(B). That rule says that, "Unless doing so is impractical, the Court must enter the preliminary order sufficiently in advance of sentencing to allow parties to suggest revisions or modifications before the order becomes final as to the defendant."

Here, because we're doing a resentencing on a -- after appeal, on a shortened timeline, I find that it was impractical to do a new preliminary forfeiture order. In any event, failure to enter a preliminary forfeiture order doesn't prevent an entry of a forfeiture order as long as the defendants had notice and an opportunity to respond. Here, I think the defendants clearly had a full opportunity and notice, and, in fact, did argue against the forfeiture. So I find that any failure to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture was harmless.

For forfeiture, Ms. Shevitz --

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes. Aside from Libretti, we argue that there's a right to a jury trial on forfeiture under Rule 32--

THE COURT: No. You've preserved -- you've made that argument. So you don't have to renew it each time. I mean I disagree. But, so if you're just doing it to preserve your appeal, you don't need to do that. If you think I've overlooked something, then certainly --

MS. SHEVITZ: Well I didn't know if you overlooked it because you had not discussed that as opposed to the Libretti

point.

THE COURT: All right. So I've certainly reviewed the materials and I think you and I disagree with respect to whether you have a right to a jury trial on the forfeiture.

With respect to forfeiture, I find that the appropriate amount is the full loss amount minus the \$200,000 that's already been paid to the Mayers. So that adds up to \$20,578,855.28.

There is no interest on forfeiture.

So, I'm going to direct the government also to submit a proposed forfeiture order reflecting that amount.

All right. I should also note to the extent that some of the proceeds were obtained by the Amerindo corporations, I find that the defendants indirectly obtained everything gained by Amerindo because they entirely dominated and controlled the companies and used the companies' assets for their own personal expenses and I'm referring to language in United States v. Peters, which I've already given the cite for. So, those are my findings with respect to the guidelines, forfeiture, and restitution.

Before I impose sentence I want to hear from counsel and anybody else who wishes to speak, including the defendants. So we'll go in the order of indictment.

Ms. Shevitz, I've read your submission and
Ms. Stafford's. Very thorough. About 70 pages. Very long.

I've read it all. But I'm happy to hear anything else you'd like to say today.

MS. SHEVITZ: I have nothing to add, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Cohn.

MR. COHN: Well, briefly, your Honor.

I note, as I think I said in the past, in my submission that the guidelines from the standpoint of sentencing for you seem to be not terribly important. You imposed a sentence under 3553 that was 75 percent of what the guidelines authorized.

THE COURT: For Mr. Tanaka. That's right.

And I think I explained myself before which is that this was not — that the sentencing guidelines make no distinction between a fraud that says you want to buy beachfront and then sells you property in the Everglades, you know, swampland and then you run off to Mexico with the money; or a Ponzi scheme where the thing has to crash inevitably. This I don't think was that kind of a fraud. But there were victims and there were losses.

MR. COHN: I understand, your Honor. And please don't take that comment that I just started with as criticism. In fact, I'm applauding the Court for saying -- for doing something which harsher judges might have done otherwise, let me put it that way.

So, I start with the proposition that Ms. Shevitz has

dealt with economic issues in a much more thorough way than I was capable of given that she was involved in the SEC litigation and I was not and I saw nothing under the Criminal Justice Act which would have allowed me to expend the kind of money to participate in that had I even applied for you to let me. But, the question occurs to me, as somebody who's been around for a long time, is having given that kind of consideration under 3553(a) in the past, and imposed a five-year sentence when you could have imposed a 20-year sentence and been safe on appeal, why you should cut it now, which I'm urging.

I'm urging that Mr. Tanaka be released essentially to do what he could have done — and the government has seemed to make some hay somehow on the fact that restitution, or disgorgement, or giving money back, or whatever hasn't happened over a ten-year period. And seems to imply that Mr. Tanaka could have done that, although I'm not exactly sure how, given that he was in jail, where a receiver is appointed, and everybody was going forward with their hand out and saying give us more money than we put in, all of which they're entitled to put forward, I guess. But the fact is that that money in the Amerindo accounts is still sitting there.

The receiver seemed to have said that there's plenty of money to make full restitution at the 2005 rates. And maybe there is and maybe there isn't quite enough. But certainly if

the accounts are not managed properly there will be less money than if they are.

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I'm not suggesting that people shouldn't want their money now. But, I'm also suggesting that, particularly for the smaller investor but even for the larger ones, that getting the full amount with additional interest, if the 3.25% you know holds water, is something that they would want to pursue otherwise. Unfortunately, as my standing here represents a finding of the Court, Mr. Tanaka's assets have been wiped out since otherwise he would have had a private counsel. And you ruled that he's indigent for the purposes of assigning counsel. But I think what I suggest -- you know when I started to write it, it seems that I had great temerity in saying three-and-a-half years is enough already. But I think it is. If, indeed, you're to order that he assists the receiver in finally coming to a conclusion and managing the accounts so that in an orderly way restitution or whatever you want to call it -- whether you want to call it disgorgement, whether you want to call it repayment, I don't really care what you call it. I care that the money appears to be there to pay these people and they should get the money at the earliest possible date in the way most calculated to give them the most money.

It seems to me that given that Mr. Tanaka only has about a year left to serve in an institution since in about a year he'll be put into what used to be called a halfway house,

that that balances out for a reason that the Court has an opportunity to do something which jail is not designed to do. Jail here is sheer punishment, it seems to me. I think the Court's comments on the deterrent value, given what people in the financial industry seem to do, has very little value. And what it is, is that it's punishment. And you're entitled to punish a miscreant for his misconduct.

But there is another issue that we should do. And we're starting to recognize it in other areas of law like in drugs and rehabilitation as opposed to jail. I'm not suggesting that Mr. Tanaka even needs rehabilitation or not. But he can assist getting the money back to the people in the most orderly way and the most complete way.

Leaving him in jail while they sell out the accounts that they're seizing, at great loss, leaving big gaps in restitution makes no earthly to me. It seems to me that if we're concerned about the victims, then there's a balance to be struck between getting them the most money the fastest way possible or leaving them holding the bag on something, for something they'll never see because there are no other assets to seize.

So, what I am suggesting to the Court -- and I realize that it's radical -- is that the Court essentially sentence him to time served and put him on postrelease probation essentially with strong conditions on his cooperation in managing the

account and making sure that the money goes to the victims in the most efficient way and most complete way. So that's why I'm suggesting that to the Court. And I hope the Court will at least consider it.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cohn.

Government wish to be heard?

MR. NAFTALIS: Just briefly, your Honor. I'm not going to retread over the defendants' conduct in this case.

Your Honor is well aware of it. It was extensively argued at the original sentencing. I want to instead address the defendants' postconviction conduct and why it supports the reimposition of the Court's original sentence.

I appreciate what Mr. Cohn is saying. I think it's -MR. COHN: I'm just standing so I can hear him. He's
facing the Court.

THE COURT: Let's make sure you're using a microphone so you can be heard. In fact, maybe even that one would be better. I think it's easier for the defense table to see you and that that mic I think is a little --

MR. COHN: I'm sorry to interrupt but I have aged ears as they are.

THE COURT: Well this is a beautiful courtroom but the acoustics are challenging so we have to do what we can. So, go ahead.

MR. NAFTALIS: Nice perspective, your Honor.

I appreciate what Mr. Cohn is saying and the hypothetical that the defendants would like to help where they can. But this is the very same claim that Tanaka advanced at the original sentencing and I think what the Court took into account at that time: That he would do what he could to get the defendants — the victims their money back. And this has been a refrain for some five years now.

But just because you say it doesn't mean it's true.

And if you look at the defendants' postconviction conduct, in particular Mr. Tanaka, they have done nothing to aid the return of money to investors. The government cites an e-mail sent by Mr. Tanaka from prison where he says, this is in connection with giving the Mayers money back, who are owed ten plus million dollars, whose house is being foreclosed upon, "These people, the Mayers, will whittle -- whittle, moan, cry and wail for the almighty shekel. I'm sure their grandmother, who accumulated this largess for their granddaughters by way of her Puerto Rican department stores, would not be very proud to hear of such spendthrifts malingering in the family tree. My gut feeling is to just let them fester."

So, your Honor, what Mr. Cohn is saying, it's nice to hear. But in practice it's just not true. Mr. Tanaka and Mr. Vilar have repeatedly tried to obstruct the return of their clients' monies and they should get no credit or not be involved in any process here at this present time.

I think we see -- we've seen what has happened.

They're not going to participate meaningfully in any way. And all they want to do is obstruct the return of investor funds.

So, in light of that, they should be — the original sentence should be reimposed because of their postconviction conduct. Their inability to say the most basic words to the victims like the Mayers, Lecube-Chavez who is literally penniless, the most basic words that, "I'm sorry." Instead, they blame the government repeatedly for their predicament. They blame every attorney who has represented them for their predicament rather than saying: I never invested a penny the way I was supposed to. I never gave my clients their money back when they asked, parens, even though there was — now they claim money in the accounts or sufficient money. And even after conviction, they have never done anything to help the return of investor funds. They have thrown up roadblock, after roadblock.

And that's what I want the Court to focus on here, your Honor, is that fact: Why the reimposition of sentence of the original sentence is important, because the defendants have in no way accepted responsibility for their actions, said I'm sorry, or in any way helped the process. The convictions are final and have been so and they still fight tooth and nail to prevent their victims from getting their money back.

Unless the court has any other questions, your Honor,

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this has been extensively briefed and you, of all people, know the record better than anyone in this courtroom and know defendants' crimes and their conduct. So I think with that, we'll rest on our papers.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Shevitz.

MS. SHEVITZ: May I just be heard for one minute on never doing anything to get the money back. We made a proposal for a payout while the defendants were in jail previously in July 2002. It was along the same lines that Mr. Gazes has adopted two years later. The amounts we said were subject to checking with the Amerindo records, which was what Sharon Levin These defendants have had no ability to do anything to accomplish the payout. The government's statement that they are obstructing it is completely untrue and unfair. We have been trying in both cases to get the money paid back, to get a valuation that is fair and to get a process. We and Julian Friedman for Mr. Marcus suggested that the magistrate judge be used or anything else. That was in January 2012 after the Court convened a joint combined matter. We made these suggestions. Everybody else has been saying no. And there is absolutely not one thing that either defendant could have done differently.

At the last sentencing your Honor asked about that, couldn't anything have been done. And Mr. Colton said, which I've quoted repeatedly from the sentencing transcript, "No,

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because I intuited that the SEC wouldn't allow them to manage anything," and that's exactly what happened.

On June 1, 2005 the SEC took them out of business of being able to do anything and has been standing in the way of getting -- letting them do anything. Whatever Mr. Tanaka said previously was in regard to a hardship request. We don't want hardship requests. We want to get the money back to the investors. There is no reason to stand in the way. We wanted to show from the beginning -- I wasn't there -- but they wanted to show that the money was there. There has been no possible way to do this. And our proposal of July 2012 was the first proposal that was rejected for no reason by the SEC only to have Mr. Gazes, in his first iteration of what should be returned, come back with substantially the same things except he omitted some of the investors who were on Sharon Levin's list. Our payout proposal came from Sharon Levin's list. That's where it came from.

I just have to object to that because the defendants have been in no way obstructive of this and I ask the Court to review the record of this, to be absolutely fair about this. If we could do something, we would do something to get that money back.

Could Mr. Colton have done something? Maybe. Maybe he could. And he said in that sentencing transcript that we would have done something differently. I think he and Mr. Litt

decided that it wasn't worth doing -- I don't know what they decided. The point is, these men stand sitting here today before you to be sentenced could do nothing about it once it was frozen. And it remains frozen. And nobody will say let's unfreeze it. Let's have JP Morgan pay interest. We can't do anything. We can't do anything. Their hands have been totally cuffed behind them.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I mean I guess I will give you a chance to respond, Mr. Naftalis, if you want.

MR. NAFTALIS: No, thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I know that there are a couple of victims who wish to be heard. Now is the time for that. Who are -

MR. NAFTALIS: Your Honor, in the courtroom are Lisa and Debra Mayer. And your Honor has Ms. Lecube-Chavez's letter to the Court.

THE COURT: I think there was some indication that it should be read aloud. Is there --

MR. NAFTALIS: That was the request. It's obviously your discretion. She just asked that it be read aloud.

THE COURT: I don't think I need it read aloud. I certainly have read it. It's part of the record. So I think that that's sufficient but if someone disagrees certainly I'm happy to hear. I mean no disrespect to Ms. Lecube-Chavez. If she were here, she would have the right to speak. She's not

here. I think the letter is part of the record and certainly has been read by me.

MR. NAFTALIS: Yes, your Honor. So your preference, or the witness's preference.

MS. SHEVITZ: I do want to hand up to the Court with regard to Ms. Lecube-Chavez two pieces of 3500 material that may also be read where in 2005 and 2007, speaking of not being able to do anything, Ms. Lecube-Chavez contacted the government. First Cindy Fraterrigo and then Edward Gallashaw. I guess he's also a postal inspector. Saying: I'm Graciela Lecube-Chavez, one of the victims. Two years she asked for the government to help get her money back and that's while it had been frozen. So I don't have extra copies of this. But 3520-6 and 3520-13. Because they bear on how the, quote, victimization perpetuated.

THE COURT: Do you want to hand those up?

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes.

THE COURT: You can give them to my law clerk. He'll meet you halfway.

So I have two Ms. Mayers. Whatever order you prefer.

Go over there to the microphone over there. If you could just state your name and spell your name so the court reporter has it down. And then just remember that the acoustics here are not great and everybody has a tendency to talk too fast in court, myself included. So keep your voice up

nice and loud and speak nice and slow.

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MS. DEBRA MAYER: Thank you, your Honor. My name is Debra Mayer. And thank you for having us speak here today.

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THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Mayer.

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MS. DEBRA MAYER: Good morning. I wrote some things down and put them in sequence in order to speak here today.

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I was with my father on February 2, 2014 when he took his last breath.

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On Friday, January 31, 2014 he asked me: What has the judge said today? I answered: Nothing new today, dad.

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He tightly shut his eyes and cringed. He left this world with excruciating and agonizing mental torment that exasperated the physical stress.

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For example, in 2008 he was in desire need of complex dental and gum surgeries in order to eventually obtain proper fitting dentures. We could not provide the appropriate medical care he so desperately needed. As time went on, he could no longer enjoy his favorite foods. With just a few teeth and nutritional deficiencies setting in, it translated into further physical deterioration. The quality of life was greatly

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diminished, a deep depression set in along with a severe mental

torture that accelerated his death.

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My sister, Lisa, and I live with acute stressful trauma. We live with the threat of being evicted from our home

along with utilities being shut off. We have incurred

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tremendous debts that haunt us daily. Thanks to the incredible benevolence of a few friends and family, we feel extremely grateful. Alberto Vilar and Gary Tanaka have had more than ample time to reconsider their actions and the painful consequences they have caused others.

Awhile ago I read a statement among the documents from Mr. Tanaka that said something to the effect, which was just said but I'll repeat it: Let the Mayers fester. They scream, wail, moan, and scamper for every shekel.

Well, may I remind them that every hard-earned shekel contributed to their business. Every hard-earned shekel they pilfered to fund their exaggerated, greedy needs and lifestyles all along with deceit, lies and ill wishes towards us. It came back to bite them.

Your Honor, I pray for fairness, truth, and justice. Thank you very much, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Mayer.

MS. LISA MAYER: Judge Sullivan, good morning. My name is Lisa Mayer.

The last time my father stood before you in the previous sentencing he said: Alberto Vilar and Gary Tanaka were aloof, dishonest, and deceitful. To this day, your Honor, Alberto Vilar and Gary Tanaka continue to lie with no remorse. After breaching our GFRDA contract and defaulting in 2003, Vilar, Tanaka, and his wife, Renata, threatened us and lied to

us and cheated us. They tried to browbeat us into submission to their way or the highway. And now we know that they had the money to pay us back every dollar they owed us. Instead, they chose, out of greed, to fund their opulent lifestyles. And they continue to lie through their counsel Vivian Shevitz by stating that we had reached a repayment agreement with Amerindo. No agreement was ever reached. Ever.

In February, 2004 I flew to London with my sister and our adviser to meet with Gary and Renata Tanaka. We insisted that a full payment was required along with our condition of collateral. There was no agreement reached at that time except for reduced and incomplete interest payments. Again, we were lied to and told that this was a temporary measure.

In September 2004 Vilar sued us for defamation in the State Supreme Court of New York.

The following year, in March of 2005 Vilar and Tanaka's lawyer Toner sent us some e-mails inviting us back to London to see if we could reach an agreement. We responded in April 2005 by saying that a trip to London would be useless unless accompanied by an escrow account of one million in collateral and an agenda for the meeting. No collateral ever materialized. No agreement was ever reached. One month later on May 26, 2005 Vilar and Tanaka were arrested by federal agents.

Your Honor, we just learned by the sentencing brief of

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Vivian Shevitz that in June of 2005 clients of Amerindo known as Dextra were paid in full in England by Renata Tanaka from her personal stash of money. As Renata was a person who dealt with clients, someone should investigate the source of her funds used to redeem clients.

Your Honor, Alberto Vilar and Gary Tanaka are arrogant liars and cheaters. They prevented the return of our money for so many years, inflicting pain and suffering on us. We have enormous debts that accrue and compound daily interest. have experienced hunger, anguish and depression. Fortunately, there are wonderful, kind individuals who helped us survive. As we found ourselves with no power after hurricane Sandy and no money for food or gas, one kind person emptied all her kitchen cabinets and showed up with groceries to our home. Other volunteers showed up and showed us love and kindness. Even as our dad deteriorated and I rode more times than I can remember by ambulance to the hospital, he eagerly awaited all news from the court. Only when reading to him the disgusting letters from Shevitz would he cry. You must persevere he told We loved our father deeply and will honor his life with a successful outcome he so deserved and wished for.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Thank you very much.

As I said before, the defendants themselves have the

right to address the court. Not required to, but certainly have a right to and are welcome to.

Mr. Vilar, is there anything you'd like to say before I impose sentence?

DEFENDANT VILAR: No, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Mr. Tanaka, is there anything you'd like to say before I impose sentence.

DEFENDANT TANAKA: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, let me tell you the sentence that I intend to impose and my reasons for it. This is an atypical sentencing in a lot of ways because we had done this once before and I spent a fair amount of time discussing my reasons for the sentence I imposed then. I've told you and others here today what the different factors are that I have to consider and these are things that have to be balanced against each other and are often in tension with each other. Last time I sentenced Mr. Vilar to nine years and Mr. Tanaka to five years which was well below the sentencing guidelines of 17-and-a-half to 22 years. And I did that for a variety of reasons, one of which was, as I said to Mr. Cohn a moment ago, my sense was that the sentencing guidelines made no distinction and still make no distinction between various types of fraud and -- that make no distinction between a pure Ponzi scheme which would collapse of its own weight where no funds were ever invested or a scheme that was sort of a con artist scheme to take money

from someone and then flee or disappear before they knew what hit them.

This was not that kind of a scheme. Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka were successful investment advisers who built careers and companies that did much good. I don't think there's any question about that. They had skill. They had ability. And they were able to help create wealth for their clients who were fabulously successful, certainly for a time. And I credit that. They had no prior criminal histories. Many people made a lot of money because of stocks that were picked by Mr. Vilar and Tanaka. So I recognize that. And I think that's a reason why a sentence below 17-and-a-half to 22 years is appropriate. I'm just sort of replowing old ground, but I think that's true.

I've also looked at the individual lives of these men. So, Mr. Vilar, in his case I commented on him being a complicated person. I think that's true. I don't think it's any less true today than it was on the day that I sentenced him in 2010; a man capable of great generosity who has helped individuals and institutions in very meaningful ways from his own wealth which was considerable. I don't think there's any dispute about that. I've read the letters that people attest to that kind of generosity and charity. A man capable of charm and a man with, you know, taste and culture and all the sorts of things that people associate with what is good in life. And

I give him credit for that. And taste and culture are important.

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Mr. Tanaka is a person who began his life in a internment camp under the worst of circumstances in a part of American history that is not a proud part of it. He was born there. His parents were sort of stripped away from everything they knew and owned and put in a camp for the duration of the war. His mother has written a very moving letter. She wrote another letter previously. Mr. Tanaka's wife writes very movingly in a very long letter about Mr. Tanaka, about his illnesses, about his spirits, about his complex personality and what separation has meant for Mr. Tanaka's family, for his child, his boy who is now 14 whom he hasn't seen in years. I've I considered all of that before and I took that certainly into account. And it was what led me to conclude that the sentence that I imposed of nine and five years was appropriate. And I don't think these factors, these 3553(a) factors that were discussed in 2010 have changed that much. So I certainly intend to impose a below-guidelines sentence.

Nevertheless, I certainly don't think a lower sentence is appropriate now. In fact, considering all of the factors and all of the circumstances in this case I believe that a higher sentence or really less of a guidelines reduction is necessary and appropriate. And I want to make this very clear. This is a resentencing. But I certainly have the authority to

impose a higher sentence where there is "objective information in the record justifying the increased sentence." That's United States v. Bryce, 287 F.3d 249 at 256 from the Second Circuit. I certainly can't hold it against the defendants that they appealed and I certainly don't. They have -- you have the right to appeal. You have the right to defend yourselves in civil cases. You have the right to protect your legal rights. Of course you do. But the circuit has held that a higher sentence on resentencing is appropriate where the defendant engages in anti-social conduct following the initial sentence. And I think that -- that's the same case, the Bryce case -- but I think that that is what happened here.

At the last sentencing I was very influenced and affected by what each of you said in open court and in your submissions, that you really wanted to get investors paid. To give a couple of examples Mr. Vilar said that "I deeply regret any inconvenience that our 14,000 clients might have suffered. Fortunately, there are only five victims, and I am 95 percent confident that they will be paid and that they will not have been lost anything." That's the sentencing, transcript of the sentencing, 60 lines 5 through 8.

Mr. Colton who was then the attorney for Mr. Tanaka stated that Mr. Tanaka had a "Commitment to get these people paid." And he has "spearheaded the effort to get the Mayers paid." That's the transcript at 107 to 108.

Mr. Tanaka himself said "Our private clients for whatever reason have had their money tied up for five years or so and I feel that they definitely are victims." That's the transcript at 139, line 24 to 140, line 1.

Mr. Tanaka continued, "I would like to get into trying my best to restore client assets." Page 142.

And again, "I hope to get the opportunity in the near term, again, to restore these client assets because I do feel deeply responsible." That's the transcript at page 144.

Since then, I have to agree with the government, that the defendants' conduct has seemed designed at every step to slow down the distribution process and to punish the investors, particularly those who testified against you at trial. Those words that were made at the sentencing in 2010, which I credited, I think have been demonstrated to be false.

Just a few examples of that. You refused to consent to allowing a distribution to investors in the civil case back in January of 2012. Ms. Shevitz, on your behalf, submitted letters refusing that consent. The government submitted letters saying that you were obstructing any attempts to get early payment. This is in the civil case, the docket 177, 187, 190, and 187. At the hearing I held with Judge Swain on January 10 of 2012 there was a lot of talk about saying you wanted to get investors paid but you shot down every idea that was proposed with the inevitable result that nothing happened.

That's the transcript from January 10 on the joint conference, page 15, lines 13 to 21, 20 -- page 20 lines 13 to 19.

You've made numerous attempts to stay the civil case. That's docket number 275.

You've opposed the appointment of a receiver insisting, what I can only say preposterously, that you be given control of the funds or that you be allowed to chose the receiver. This was a point made as recently as April 14 in Mr. Cohn's sentencing memorandum at page four.

You've refused to cooperate with the receiver at every turn, have consistently endeavored to slow him down and delay the return of assets to the investors. I'll point to the hearing of October 25 in the civil case, line -- page 15, line 22 to 18, line 4; page 22, lines 5 through 23, line 2; page 27, line 15 to page 28, line 5.

You've written letters to investors that seemed designed to confuse them and to undermine the legitimacy of the process. Those letters are Exhibits B and C to the government's sentencing submission.

You at various times insisted that you were the true owners of the assets in the funds contrary to all the evidence and to your own statements at the 2010 sentencing.

And in some ways worst of all I think you have consistently refused hardship distributions to the Mayers or any other victims even though you knew that the Mayers have

really been left in very difficult financial circumstances.

I'll point to the civil case docket number 360, 186, transcript of the January 10 conference at page 54, line 22 to 55, line 17; as well as page 58, lines 8 through 11; 61, lines 14 through 24; page 62, lines 21 to 24; and page 63, lines 11 to 25.

I think your attitudes towards the Mayers has been exactly what Mr. Tanaka said in the communication that was quoted by the government here today, which is also included as Exhibit A in their submission, the Mayers should just fester. You wanted them to do what Ms. Lecube-Chavez testified at trial you did to her, which is to turn them, like you turned her, into a beggar for their own money.

I think that's unfair. I think it's unjust.

Dr. Mayer came to the last sentencing. He talked about the harm that you had done to him. And it seems to me that you've done everything in your power since to make sure that he didn't get paid before he died. He died earlier this year, still waiting for justice. That was described by the Mayer sisters, still waiting a return for his money, earned by him and others, I gather, but certainly his money. Ms. Colburn is also dead. The other victims are five years older and no better off.

Ms. Lecube-Chavez in her letter to the court I think well captures the consequences of that delay and the reneging of the promises made by Mr. Tanaka and Vilar at the sentencing.

She writes "After years living as the victim in the money dealings of a trusted professional like Mr. Alberto Vilar, I find myself with 89 years of age, facing diabetes and arthritis. I'm a proud woman, humble and grateful, who planned for a simple future, never thinking that a can of soup would be my dinner, unable to pay for medicine I need, or forced to cancel dental work for lack of funds."

Those are the real consequences of this scheme. And those are consequences that I think have been exacerbated over the past five years since 2010 when the defendants asserted their determination to make sure that investors like

Ms. Lecube-Chavez would be paid.

Now the defendants and their counsel are quick to blame the government, the court, past lawyers, the receiver, the SEC, and the victims themselves for these delays. I think that's dishonest. I think it shows lack of remorse. I think it shows their continued bad faith and their continuing desire to inflict pain on those who dare to challenge them and dare to bring them to justice. I think that's consistent with what took place throughout the scheme, which I commented on at the last sentencing, that this was a scheme that was basically designed to take advantage of unsophisticated people, people who could be intimidated, people who could be pushed around or stonewalled. The institutional investors didn't get treated this way. The sophisticated investors who would push back and

cry foul quickly weren't treated that way. It was a certain type of investor who they thought that they could get over on while their economic circumstances were dire. I think that was part of the scheme. I think that they're still doing that today against victims that they now are acting vindictively toward. That's I think the only conclusion I can draw from these facts.

Now I don't suggest that all of the delay is attributable to the defendants. The wheels of justice sometimes move slowly. I don't suggest for a moment that this is entirely attributable to the defendants, but I do think they're responsible for much of it. I think it was intentional. I think it was designed to inflict pain and hardship on those who testified against them. I think it's been in direct tension with the pronouncements made by the defendants that they would do everything in their power to repay their investors. I can't ignore that. I won't ignore that.

In 2010 I sentenced Mr. Vilar to nine years, about half of what the sentencing guidelines called for. I sentenced Mr. Tanaka to five years, which was about three-quarters below the bottom end of the sentencing guidelines range.

The defendants' conduct since then persuades me that such a reduction was unwarranted, or put another way, that their subsequent conduct justifies a higher sentence; that the

towards those who testified against them at trial.

defendants words at sentencing were false and designed to mislead the Court and the victims; that the defendants have no remorse and they are, in fact, determined to act vindictively

So for that reason I intend to sentence Mr. Vilar to 120 months or ten years. That's a year more than what I sentenced before. I think I would be justified in going much higher, but I don't want there to be the appearance of vindictiveness on my part even though I think I've rebutted that amply in the record here. I think it's important nevertheless to send a message to the victims that I haven't been oblivious to this and that this is something that has to be acknowledged.

So I intend to impose a sentence of ten years on Mr. Vilar and six years on Mr. Tanaka, in each case a year more than what I imposed last time.

In Mr. Vilar's case it will be sentences of 60 months on Counts One, Four, Five and Twelve which are capped at five years, and 120 months on Counts Two, Three, Six through Eleven, all to run concurrently.

For Mr. Tanaka I'm going to impose a sentence of five years on Counts One and Four, which again are capped at five years, and six years on Count Three, again, to run concurrently.

In addition to those terms of imprisonment I will

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impose a three-year term of supervised release for each defendant with the same terms and conditions I've previously imposed before.

With respect to the fine, previously I imposed a very modest fine. I think for the reasons I've articulated here today that a higher fine is appropriate. I think more importantly with respect to a fine, I think that at the last sentencings the defendants each said or argued that they had virtually no assets. They are now claiming the residual amount in the Amerindo accounts which they claim could be worth millions or tens of millions of dollars and that may, in fact, be true. I think those accounts have not yet been fully valued and so there may be a remainder. To the extent that millions of dollars or tens of millions of dollars fall to these defendants, then I think the higher fine is warranted, particularly in light of the conduct that I talked about today. So, in light of that, I intend to impose a fine of \$10 million on top of the restitution and forfeiture that I've already articulated.

In addition, then, I will impose a special assessment totaling \$1,200 for Mr. Vilar, one hundred dollars on each count; and \$300 on Mr. Tanaka, one hundred dollars on each count.

So, that's the sentence I intend to impose. I should state that I find these sentences appropriate. They're well

below the guidelines. But I think that a lower sentence would not be appropriate in light of all of the objectives of sentencing set forth in Section 3553(a) of Title 18.

I would also note for the record that I would reach this same sentence even if the guidelines range were lower, if the losses to -- that I've attributed to Cox and Colburn were not included in the loss amount, and even if the enhancement for role and oversees activity would not apply.

The guidelines are a guide. They're a tool. They're advisory. But ultimately on the entire record I think this is an appropriate sentence. And if my guidelines calculations were to be deemed incorrect in any way, I can say that candidly it wouldn't have made a difference for purposes of the sentence that I intend to impose.

So is there any legal impediment to my imposing such a sentence? Ms. Shevitz?

MS. SHEVITZ: Let me think for a minute.

THE COURT: While you're thinking I'll ask the same question to Mr. Cohn.

MR. COHN: No.

THE COURT: I'll ask the government. Any legal impediment to my imposing that sentence?

MR. NAFTALIS: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Shevitz.

MS. SHEVITZ: I have asked for hearings on certain

issues and your Honor has said no.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. SHEVITZ: So that being said and preserving my objections to that, I guess there is no other specific legal reason to -- for you not to impose a higher sentence except under North Carolina v. Pearce and other cases of that nature.

THE COURT: So then Mr. Vilar let me ask you please to stand.

Mr. Vilar, having presided over your trial at which the jury returned a guilty verdict I now sentence you as follows. I sentence you to a term of incarceration that will total ten years. And it will be accounted as follows: Five years each on Counts One, Four, Five and Twelve of the indictment, those counts have a five-year maximum; as well as ten years on Counts Two, Three, and Six through Eleven, all to run concurrent.

In addition, I impose a three-year term of supervised release to include the terms and conditions that were set forth in the presentence report that I already stated on the record.

I'm happy to restate them if anybody wants me to. But if you don't think it's necessary, I won't.

Do you have a thought on that Ms. Shevitz?

MS. SHEVITZ: I'm sorry. What?

THE COURT: For the terms and conditions of supervised release. I'm imposing the exact same terms I imposed before.

MS. SHEVITZ: Having not been at the prior sentence and not focused on them, yes, I'd like to hear them again.

THE COURT: Let me just get them here and I'll read them.

So, the conditions of supervised release will include the following mandatory standard and special conditions.

First, you're not to commit any additional federal, state, or local crimes.

You shall not possess a firearm or destructive device of any kind.

You shall not possess or use drugs of any kind.

In addition, I'm going to impose the following special conditions. First, that you shall provide the probation officer with access to any requested financial information.

You shall not incur new credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer.

You shall submit your person, your residence, your place of business, your vehicle or any other premises under your control to a search on the basis that the probation officer has reasonable belief that contraband or evidence of a violation of the conditions of supervised release may be found. That search must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner but failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation. And the defendant shall inform any other residents that the premises that he shares with them may

be subject to a search pursuant to this condition.

I'm not going to require drug testing for Mr. Vilar.

I don't think he possesses any risk of drug use.

There are 13 standard conditions that are imposed in virtually every case involving supervised release. I will impose those here as well. And I will order that Mr. Vilar be supervised in the district of his residence. All right.

As I said, I'm going to impose a \$10 million fine joint and several with -- well, a \$10 million fine, excuse me.

I'm going to impose restitution in the amount that I announced before to each of the victims. I'll issue a separate order for restitution but I've announced what those amounts are.

I'm also going to order forfeiture in the amounts that I've already recited as well as a special assessment of \$1200, one hundred dollars for each count of conviction.

So that's the sentence of the Court.

Please have a seat.

MS. SHEVITZ: And we have asked for the recommendation of designation to the Otisville camp.

THE COURT: I will make that recommendation. It's only a recommendation. I can't order the Bureau of Prisons to move defendants or prisoners to any particular place but I'll certainly make that recommendation and hopefully they can accommodate it.

MS. SHEVITZ: Or if not close to this.

THE COURT: Close to the New York area.

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes.

THE COURT: So I'll refer -- I'll specifically ask for Otisville's camp or such other facilities as are as close as possible to the New York area.

MS. SHEVITZ: But that of course is preferred. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Tanaka, would you please stand.

Mr. Tanaka, having presided over your trial and received a guilty verdict from the jury on three of the counts of the indictment, I sentence you as follows.

I sentence you to a term of incarceration of six years in total, to be broken down as follows. Five years on Counts
One and Four, and six years on Count Three, all to run concurrently.

In addition, to that term of imprisonment I also impose a three-year term of supervised release with the same conditions I imposed last time which are the same conditions that I just recited for Mr. Vilar. I'm happy to recite them again if you think it helps.

MR. COHN: Not necessary.

THE COURT: As I said, I'm going to order restitution for each of the victims in the amount that I previously stated and forfeiture in the amount that I've previously stated as

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well as a special assessment of \$300, one hundred dollars for each count of conviction.

Are there any recommendations you would like me to make?

MR. COHN: Otisville, your Honor, the camp. And in your recommendation I would suggest that you add the reason for it is because of continuing litigation and access to local counsel being the reason for it.

THE COURT: I can put that. I don't know if that has any magic effect.

MR. COHN: I don't know either.

THE COURT: I don't think it does but in fact --

MR. COHN: It's like chicken soup, Judge, it can't hurt.

THE COURT: I'll mention it but, again, I don't think it's -- it's not up to me ultimately what the Bureau of Prisons does but they generally try to honor these requests and I'll certainly make the request but that's New York for purposes of an appeal, which I'll remind the defendants of their right to appeal this sentence in a moment. But otherwise, Mr. Tanaka has family in California. Once that's done, does he wish to be in California?

MR. COHN: No.

THE COURT: Okay. So, that's the sentence of the Court. I will make the recommendation. Please have a seat.

1 MR. COHN: Thank you, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: So let me remind each of you -- is there 3 something you wanted to say? 4 MR. NAFTALIS: Two things, your Honor. One, I just 5 wanted to make sure that your Honor impose the ten million 6 dollar fine as to --7 THE COURT: Yes. Ten million dollar fine as to 8 Mr. Tanaka. If I didn't say that, I'm sorry. 9 MR. NAFTALIS: Just to clarify as to Mr. Vilar had 10 some objections with respect to hearings that were preserved. 11 Aside from the hearing on Dextra, is there any other hearing 12 that we're talking about? 13 THE COURT: I understood -- you're asking Ms. Shevitz 14 to clarify? Is that what you mean? 15 MR. NAFTALIS: I'm asking your Honor, yes. THE COURT: Well I think my sense was Ms. Shevitz was 16 17 referring to a trial for forfeiture and a hearing with respect to some -- the loss amounts or loss circumstances but 18 19 Ms. Shevitz can speak for herself. The hearings you were 20 referring to before? 21 MS. SHEVITZ: Well the other hearing that I think 22 would be appropriate is the hearing on what motivation that you 23 are ascribing a motivation to the defendants to obstruct the

return of investor funds. I asked -- I asked for a hearing on

that because the reasons for that obviously have driven the

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Court to increase the sentence. I think those reasons should be subjected to an adversary analysis and witnesses.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me remind the defendants that they have a right to appeal this sentence. You appealed once before. But you have a right to appeal the sentence, certainly. I mean many of the arguments that were appealed with respect to the trial are over. But you certainly have a right to appeal the sentence. If you wish to appeal, you would need to file a notice of appeal within two weeks. So talk to your attorneys about that. That's just a notice, it doesn't require the full briefing, but the notice within two weeks.

MS. SHEVITZ: We have notice right here.

THE COURT: Okay. In any event, within two weeks.

MS. SHEVITZ: Do I hand it up --

THE COURT: No. Don't hand it up to me. You should deal with the clerk's office on all of that.

Is there anything else that we should cover today?

MR. COHN: Nothing.

MR. NAFTALIS: No, thank you, your Honor.

MR. COHN: I was speaking to Ms. Shevitz.

THE COURT: Anything else you'd like to cover today,
Ms. Shevitz?

MS. SHEVITZ: I would like, if possible, ten minutes to talk to the clients after we're through before the marshals take them back.

THE COURT: Can I -- I defer to the marshals on this just because they have tough restrictions on them. Is that all right? Can the lawyers and clients have a couple of minutes before they're taken back?

THE MARSHAL: She can speak to her clients downstairs in the interview room, sir.

MS. SHEVITZ: That's very difficult because I have to talk to both of them and you can only have one there at a time. It's impossible to do that there.

THE COURT: Could you give them a couple of minutes?

THE MARSHAL: Give them five minutes.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. I appreciate that.

I generally defer to the marshals because they have a tough job and a lot of demands.

MS. SHEVITZ: I understand but it just -- the circumstances are not possible.

THE COURT: So five minutes. After that then you'll need to probably just take it up with them subsequently either downstairs today or at the institution later.

Well let me say this then. It's been a long proceeding. It's been a long case. I don't wish either of you ill. As I've said before, I think there's much admirable in each of you. I imposed a sentence that I think was just. I explained my reasons for it. I don't pretend for a moment that it makes everyone happy. It perhaps makes no one happy. But

my job is to impose a sentence that I think is appropriate in light of all the different factors that I mentioned. I don't believe in hiding the ball or I think I am obligated to tell you my reasons and I've endeavored to do that. I do wish you the best. I wish you health and I wish you happiness and that ultimately you put this behind you and resume your lives with your families and loved ones. So that's my hope for you. But I can't stress enough how there were real victims here. You don't seem to think so. But I think it's just so obvious and so palpable that I hope you will reflect on that. A lot of pain was caused. And it needn't have been.

So with that I want to thank all who came here today. I want to thank the marshals and the court reporter. the students, maybe we'll just meet in the jury room just so I can say hello and thank you for coming. My law clerk will take you over. Thanks. Have a good day.

(Adjourned)

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